Tuesday, March 5, 2019

Indiana Building Supplies

Indiana mental synthesis Supplies Comment An analysis of these ratios shows that both Clemens and Willis atomic number 18 right. All of the profitability ratios for IBS are high than the fabrication mediocre. Thus, IBS ceasevassms to amaze done well. And indeed, it was done well for its shareholders in 2005. stemma, however, that the current and quick ratios have generally been trending downward and are significantly lower than the industry modal(a)s as well as the stipulations in the give covenants. Thus, liquidity is poor. Moreover, inventory is turning over very slowly and the second-rate collection finis has increased significantly.These figures are manifestations of IBSs policy of upbringing prices and focusing almost exclusively on Indiana customers who are comparatively price-insensitive but have a more uncertain demand. It seems like IBS is charging a sufficiently high price to overcome a sales level that is significantly lower than it was in 2004. In fact, it has probably been undefeated to beleaguer a robust demand from its Indiana customers (it is reasonable to assume paltry demand from Ohio and Missouri), so that it did not experience a more needlelike decline in sales relative to its 2004 sales.In addition to this, IBS has also see very high volatility in its liquidity and inventory turnover ratios during 2005, an opposite development that is consistent with its pricing strategy. The leng and thening of the collection period seems to indicate that Indiana customers are more risky in the instinct that they dont pay as promptly as the average out customer. What does this mean for the swan? Peter Willis is correct in being concerned. What IBS seems to be doing is to adopt a strategy of increasing risk for the chance of higher profit.Raising the prices of its outputs is equivalent to concentrating on the Indiana market and excluding the Ohio and Missouri markets. This means ever-changing its market in such a way that IBS now fa ces a riskier demand schedule for its products, but one that yields it higher profits if it is lucky. Since the bank is simply repaid what it is owed, it does not benefit from this higher profit-higher risk strategy. If IBS is successful in selling forth all that it produces (i. e. , if the Indiana customers exhibit sufficiently high demand), then all of the extra profits go to IBS.On the other hand, if demand is poor and IBS cannot unload its undefiled goods inventory, the bank may not be repaid and could be left holding a mix of finished goods, work-in-progress and raw materials inventory. So, the bank absorbs much of the risk associated with IBSs pricing strategy. This is a classic example of moral hazard related to risky debt. Note also that IBSs debt ratio has been increasing since 2000, and now it is well in a higher place the industry average as well as what is permitted in the bestow covenants. This also hurts IBSs creditors since their risk exposure is increased.Moreove r, as we saw in our discussion of capital in this chapter, a decline in integrity capital relative to sum up assets increases the firms incentive to sate more risk at the creditors expense. So, Clemens willingness to go along with Klinghoffers insinuation now is not that surprising. Note that the benefits of increased profitability are reorient more in favor of IBSs shareholders for 2005 the return on the displace worth of IBS is 299 basis points above the industry average, whereas its return on total assets is 70 basis points above the industry average.Let us now see if IBS could gravel enough cash internally to repay FNBB its old add as well as the new loan. As we saw in our earlier discussion, there are one-third sources of internal cash multiplication (i)net income and depreciation, (ii)reduction of accounts receivables, and (iii)reduction of inventory. Now, suppose that we can get IBS to bring its ratios in line with industry averages. How much cash will this generate ? (i) Net income and depreciation take for granted cash flows from earnings and deprecation in 2006 remain the same as in 2005, we have cash flows from earnings plus deprecation = $202,500 + $72,000 = $274,500. ii)Reduction of accounts receivables In 2005, IBSs average collection period was 49 twenty-four hourss, whereas the industry average was 37 days. Current accounts receivable = $600,000 (Average collection period = 49 days) communicate accounts receivable = (Sales / day) * 37 days = ($4,500,000/365) * 37 days = $456,164 where ($4,500,000/365) is sales/day for 2005. If IBS could reduce its average collection period by 12 days, it could generate $600,000 $456,164 = $143,836 (iii)Inventory In 2005, IBSs inventory turnover ratio was 5, whereas the industry average was 8. 5.If IBS could increase its ratio to the industry average by reducing its inventory, then this would generate $900,000 $529,412 = $370,588, where $900,000 is the actual 2005 inventory and $529,412 = year 2005 IBS sales/ 8. 5. Adding up these three sources gives us $788,924 (=$274,500 + $143,836 + $370,588). If a new loan were to be extended, IBS would owe FNBB $473,000 + $220,000 = $693,000, assume a 10% interest on the new loan and no new interest accumulation on the old loan. Thus, if sufficient hang-up measures could be taken, IBS could generate enough cash internally to pay off the bank. A word of caution, though.The $788,924 is a very optimistic estimate since it assumes that IBS can bring its ratios in line with industry averages without affecting its profit margin. This is unlikely. We would inspire not calling the old loan and extending the new loan, but asking IBS to do the following 1. Reduce sales prices so as to be competitive with sellers in Ohio and Missouri. 2. Pursue a more aggressive market strategy to reduce inventories and accounts receivables. 3. Cut back on production to catch inventory does not get stockpiled. 4. recover tough in collecting old accounts from Indiana customers even if it means sacrificing few future business. .Provide some augmentation of equity by cutting back on dividends and possibly outcome some more new equity at an appropriate time. Get the debt ratio down. 6. Do not take on new debt to substitute the $200,000 that will be paid off with the bank loan. 7. Secure the bank loan with specific (inside) collateral if not already done so. 8. formulate a realistic periodic loan repayment plan. 9. Consider the possibility of asking for a personal loan guarantee from Bob Clemens. We have assumed that the accounting practices of other firms in the industry are parallel to IBSs, so that a comparative ratio analysis like this is meaningful.

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